




I. Jurisdiction Over Nationals: The Case of
the Curiously Reluctant Prosecutor
In February of 1976, it was revealed in the international press that British
nationals had been fighting as mercenaries in the Angolan civil war.1 The
English Prime Minister announced that a government committee had been set
up under the direction of Lord Kenneth Diplock to investigate whether the
existing British Foreign Enlistment Act2 provided adequate legislation to
control the recruitment of United Kingdom citizens for service as mercenaries. 3
The Diplock Committee Report, 4 released the following August, surprisingly
recommended abolition of those portions of the Foreign Enlistment Act which
made it a crime for British nationals to enlist as mercenaries' and indicated that
a major reason for decriminalizing foreign enlistment was the impossibility of
securing extraterritorial enforcement of British law. The Committee argued: 6
There is an important juristic distinction, as well as a practical one, between a law
which seeks to control what is done by people when they are within the United King-
dom and what is done by them when they are not. National sovereignty is territorial
and the national law of a state is not enforceable outside the state's own boundaries. If
the law purports to prohibit a particular kind of conduct by its citizens when they are
abroad the state itself has no means of enforcing the prohibition. All that it can do is to
provide for prosecution and punishment of the offender when he returns.
From this key passage, it is unclear to what purpose the Committee is relying
*A.B., University of Wisconsin, 1972; third year law student, Wayne State University.
'British Mercenaries Forced to Shoot Comrades 15 Feb. 1976 Manchester Guardian Weekly 3.
'The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90.
'See Chase, Decriminalization of Foreign Enlistment (manuscript, 1976).4Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Inquire Into the Recruitment of
Mercenaries (Cmnd. 6569, 1976) (hereinafter cited as "DR").
Ild. 10-11.
'Id. 3.
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upon the axiomatic7 principle of law that, in general, and with certain well-
recognized exceptions, criminal jurisdiction is territorial.' It is true that the
principle prohibits a state from enforcing its laws within the jurisdiction of
another sovereign. 9 Thus, British police cannot arrest accused criminals outside
of Britain. 10 But this restraint placed upon a state's extraterritorial enforcement
measures by the territorial principle prevents the arrest abroad of British
nationals by British officials regardless of whether the nationals to be arrested
are accused of having committed crimes within or outside British territorial
jurisdiction. For example, if a British national robs a bank in Manchester, the
territorial principle prevents his arrest in Marseilles by British police without
permission from the French authorities. Yet the practical problems of extradi-
tion and enforcement do not provoke the British government to decriminalize
bank robbery in England.
The evidentiary problems involved in prosecuting nationals for crimes
committed abroad would again present practical difficulties for prosecution but
would not constitute the basis for "an important juristic distinction" between
laws which seek to prohibit certain conduct by nationals when within, as
opposed to without, the state's territory."I The juristic distinction which the
Diplock Committee appears to wish to make, and which is perhaps an implicit
reason for their conclusion that British nationals should not be punished for
foreign enlistment, is the conventional common law reluctance to exercise juris-
diction at all over extraterritorial criminal conduct. Thus while appearing to be
concerned about "enforcement," the Committee's real concerns may rest upon
the more difficult terrain of "jurisdictional competence," and it is to this area
which we now turn.
At common law, a state could not exercise jurisdiction over its own citizens
for crimes committed outside of the state's territory.1" Nevertheless, Coke
records that such jurisdiction was secured by the Court of the Constable and
'Case Note, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 317 (1913): "There is a general proposition of criminal law
which has been so frequently reiterated and so generally accepted without question that it has
become almost axiomatic. It is, that crimes are purely local and punishable only in the jurisdiction
where committed."
'See 6 Whiteman, Digest ofInternationalLaw, pp. 88 ff., BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3rd ed.,
pp. 535 ff., and Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle 30 MICH. L. REV. 238
(1932).
'Beckett, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners BRrr. YEARBOOK OF IN'L LAW
44 (1925).
101. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299-300 (1973).
"DR, supra 9-10; see also Roebuck, The Diplock Report on Mercenaries 13 August 1976 NEW
STATESMAN 202.2Case Note, supra note 7 at 318 (note 4): "Lord Brougham in Warrender v. Warrender, 9 Bligh
89 (Engl., 1934) at p. 119 says: 'The lex loci must needs govern all criminal jurisdiction, from the
nature of the thing and the purpose of that jurisdiction."'
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Marshal. 13 Although one continues to occasionally encounter constructions
placed upon the territorial principle which cause it to appear exclusive, 4 by
1935 the Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime"
included a comment that "the competence of the State to prosecute and punish
its nationals on the sole basis of their nationality is universally conceded." ' 6
The Harvard Research project included an impressive list of American and
British statutes under which nationals had been punished for crimes committed
abroad,' 7 including the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 187018 whose repeal is
now urged by the Diplock Committee. Mssrs. Brierly and DeVisscher had in
fact reported in 1926 to the League of Nations Committee on the Codification
of International Law' 9 that a statement of the sovereign right to exercise juris-
diction over nationals abroad could be eliminated since "no good purpose would
be served by suggesting that a principle so well established should be embodied
in a convention."
20
Although various rationales are advanced in behalf of this nationality prin-
ciple, 2' the generally agreed basis for the exercise of extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction over nationals is the allegiance owed by them to their sovereign.2"
Since the jurisdiction which a sovereign exercises over its own nationals is never
the concern of another state, 3 such extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction exists
outside of international law. 24 The specific safeguards under which extrater-
"Id. (note 5): "Coke, 3 Inst. 48: 'If two of the king's subjects go over into a foreign realm and
fight there, and the one kill the other, this murder being done out of the realm, cannot be for want
of trial heard and determined by the common law, but it may be heard and determined before the
constable and marshal."'
"Niboyet, Territoriality and Universal Recognition of Rules of Conflicts of Laws 65 HAuv. L.
REv. 582, 585-586 (1952): "It seems normal to start from this indisputable social fact that whatever
occurs in a given territory is subject to the law in force in that territory. That law alone can fix the
circumstances under which a fact will become a legal fact and those under which it will remain
without legal consequences ... Occurences within the territory should be governed by the local law
without record to the nationality of the interested parties." (emphasis added)
"Harvard Law School Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime 29 Am.




"Woolsey, Extraterritorial Crimes 20 AM. J. IN'L L. 757 (1926).
0Id. 757.
" arv. Res., supra note 15 at 519-520.
"1R. LErLAR, AMEiucAN CONFLIcTS LAw 274 (1968): "The underlying theory is that duties owed
by a citizen to his nation are so substantial and so permanent that they follow him anywhere and at
all times persist even though he by his presence at another place may owe duties to the law of that
place also."
'"Narv. Res., supra note 15 at 531: "While it may be hoped, and indeed expected, that all States
will circumscribe the exercise of jurisdiction over their nationals with desirable conditions or
safeguards, the present Convention leaves each State free to confine or expand the exercise of such
jurisdiction as its own internal policy may dictate."
'Becket, supra note 9 at 45: "The jurisdiction, which a state chooses to exercise over its own
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ritorial jurisdiction is exercised and the circumstances justifying its use2 are
determined independently by individual states within their sovereign capacity. 26
Common law countries tend to confine the exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction over nationals more narrowly than civil law countries. 2 7 To some extent,
this restricted practice is merely a result of the familiar process by which
common law juridical notions (in this instance, the territorial principle) tend to
develop a life of their own.28 There are also real dangers implicit in the exercise
of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction arising from the fact that while an
individual is subject to the law of his sovereign under the nationality principle,
he remains within the territorial jurisdiction of the state where his criminal
conduct took place.29
Thus there is the potential at least for confusion and perhaps double jeopardy
associated with concurrent jurisdiction. 30 Further, there is a legitimate concern
regarding the quality and availability of evidence when a defendant is tried a
great distance from the location where he is purported to have committed a
crime.3 Consequently, some discretion must be employed in determining
whether or not to bring a particular prosecution on the basis of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction. 32
Both American and English courts tend to treat legislative enactments as
territorial in their application unless they are specifically designated extraterri-
torial in effect. 3 3 This principle of statutory construction is modified however by
the practice of interpreting statutes in such a way as to avoid defeating their
clear purpose. Thus in United States v. Bowman, 34 the Supreme Court held that
American citizens could be found guilty of conspiring to defraud a United
nationals in relation to acts performed at home or abroad, can never be the concern of any other
state and is therefore quite outside the sphere of international law." But for international legal
control over some relations between states and their own nationals see J. L. Brierly, The Law of
Nations, Sec. 6, LIMITS UPON A STATE'S TREATMENT OF ITS OwN NATION.s (1963).
25Harv. Res., supra note 15 at 522.
211d. 519.
"Id. 519-539; Brownlie, supra, note 10 at 293.
2
"George, Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation 64 MicH. L. Rv. 609, 636 (1966):
"[T]here is considerable inertia behind the verbal tradition that crimes can be based only on activity
observable within the state." See also Case Note, supra note 7 at 317: "As a broad statement of the
law, (the territorial principle) is true, but there is one important phase of the situation which seems
to have been so engulfed by the very generality of this proposition, that it has been lost sight of by
members of the bar, and has allowed some of our courts to go astray in its application, or rather
non-application."
"George, supra note 28 at 637; BROWNLIE, supra, note 10 at 299.
"Moore, Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case U.S. FOR. REL. 757, 780 (1887).
"Id.; George, supra, note 28 at 637.
"Harv. Res., supra, note 15 at 531.
"See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); The Sussex Peerage,
11 CL. & FIN. 85, 146 (1844).
11260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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States agency in violation of the Criminal Code even though the criminal
conspiracy took place on the high seas and within the jurisdiction of another
country.3" Chief Justice Taft argued that some offenses:3 6
are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly
to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for
frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at
home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision
in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it
to be inferred from the nature of the offense.
Indeed, a very similar argument was advanced by Lord Russell, C.J., in the
case of Queen v. Jameson3 7 which resulted in a conviction under the British
Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870. The Jameson indictment was brought under
Section 1119 of the Act. 40 However Section 4,41 applying to enlistment in the
service of a foreign state (the repeal of which section is recommended by the
Diplock Committee' 2), states specifically that the prohibition applies to any
person "being a British subject, within or without Her Majesty's domin-
ions. .... -,4 Consequently it cannot be doubted but that Parliament has
granted the courts extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over British nationals
who enlist as mercenaries in violation of the Act.
Of course, British and American courts are obligated to construe statutes in
conformity with international law to the extent such a construction is at all
possible." Yet there is no question of international law involved in interpreting
the Foreign Enlistment Act's applicability to British nationals since, again, this
is a matter exclusively within the competence of England as a sovereign state.
Thus, it cannot be contended that the internationally recognized' 5 principle of
territorial criminal jurisdiction precludes sovereign states from exercising
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over their own nationals. Questions of
concurrent jurisdiction, admissibility of evidence, and statutory interpretation
may determine in specific instances whether or not the nationality principle is
invoked to bring particular extraterritorial acts within the jurisdiction of British
"Id. %-97.
16d. 98.
312 Q.B. 425, 430-431 (1896).
'The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 90.
"Section 11 prohibits the preparation and fitting out of foreign military expeditions.
'
0Jameson, op. cit., 425.
"Section 4 is titled "Penalty on enlistment in service of foreign state."
"DR, supra, note 4 at 10-11, 14.
"Emphasis added.
"INTERNATIONAL LAW: BENo THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HIERscH LuTERPicHT (ed. by E.
Lauterpacht, 1970) Vol. I 157, 170.
"Hare. Res., supra, note 15 at 519-539; L. OPPEiEHms, INTERNATiONAL LAW (ed. by H.
Lauterpacht, VIII ed.) Vol. I 330; WHEATON'S INTERNATIONAL LAw (ed. by A. Keith, 1929) Vol. I
270.
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courts. However, it is far from clear what combination of these circumstances
compels the Diplock Committee to propose that all foreign enlistment
prohibitions be repealed, legislation without which no prosecution whatever
may be brought.
H. Jurisdiction Over Non-Nationals: The Case of
the Unexpectedly Similar Precedents
The development of judicial practice regarding the exercise of jurisdiction
over extraterritorial violations of American antitrust legislation has had a
controversial and inordinately complicated career. 46 Lengthy and uncertain
doctrinal evolution has produced a correspondingly extensive literature within
the business and legal communities47 which has, on balance, tended to further
confuse the central issues involved and has failed to resolve any more clearly
than the courts the contradiction between the increasingly transnational
character of functional economic units which affect the American domestic
market and the political risks involved in exerting extraterritorial jurisdiction
over economic practices within foreign jurisdictions and commercial spheres.41
Nevertheless, an oversimplified and schematic rendition of the theoretical
approaches to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases has
the value of making possible a brief assessment of the entire scope of debate.
The participants, beyond the United States Justice Department, may include
a variety of juristic persons ranging from American corporations doing business
abroad and their subsidiaries to foreign subsidiaries of American firms or
foreign corporations doing little or no business in this country. 49 The alleged
locus delicti may include a boardroom in Switzerland or a Latin American
jungle and its precise definition is frequently the center of disagreement.50
The theoretical positions fall along a spectrum whose polar limits are: (A)
The "strict territoriality theory""1 which asserts that American courts cannot
take jurisdiction over antitrust cases (even when only American corporations are
involved) if the alleged violations take place outside of the United States. " The
"See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AmwcAN BusINss ABROAD (1958) which remains the
best single source in this area.
"Useful bibliographies are found in Raymond, A NewLook at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 558, 558 (note 3) (1967); Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in
United States Antitrust Law 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 100 (note 1) (1967).
"R. FALx, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SocIETr 272-273 (1970).
"George, ExtraterritorialApplication of PenalLegislation 64 MIcH. L. REv. 609, 632 (1966).
'°Raymond, supra note 47 at 569.
1 'Beckett, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners BurT. YEARBOOK OF INT'L L.
44, 45 (1925): "The view, that the jurisdiction of states is limited by the law of nations to crimes
committed on their territory, may be described as 'the strict territorial theory'..
"FAL, supra, note 48 at 280.
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rationale for this position is either that the territoriality principle precludes
giving extraterritorial effect to national legislation5 3 or else the less extreme
position that Congress did not intend the antitrust acts to have extraterritorial
extension.54 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co."5 (the first extraterri-
torial antitrust adjudication) is frequently cited as authority for either of these
arguments. (B) The "intended impact theory" 5 6 which contends that American
courts can assume jurisdiction over antitrust cases (even when no American
corporations are involved) if the allegedly illegal activity was intended to have an
impact on American domestic commerce. 7 The rationale for this position is
that without extraterritorial regulation, the sources of restraint upon trade
affecting the domestic market can simply be located beyond the boundaries of
American territorial jurisdiction.5 8 The well known and controversial authority
for this theory is United States v. Aluminum Co. of America. "9
Professor Richard Falk reiterates the dichotomy in parallel terms:60
There are two alternative constructions of lex loci delicti: first, the physical act or
subjective territorial theory; secondly, the place of harm or objective territorial theory.
The Banana case expresses the traditional physical act theory that limits jurisdiction to
the place where the illegal act physically occurred.
"Courts have implicitly moved toward the place of harm theory," Falk con-
tinues,
and in Alcoa jurisdiction was upheld because an agreement made in Switzerland
caused harm to the United States, although no significant act, albeit an omission, was
commited within the United States. This latter construction, permitting the regulation
of any undesirable foreign activity, provided only that the defendant can be hauled
before the court, has been challenged for its flexibility.
Substantially less moderate words than "flexibility" have been used to describe
the jurisdictional authority claimed for American courts in the Alcoa decision. 61
It is interesting to investigate the sources of Judge Hand's opinion in Alcoa and
contrast them with their counterpart, the Banana opinion rendered by Justice
Holmes.
The critical passage from Alcoa which is frequently cited6" as expressing the
"
3Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws 63 YALE L.J.
655, 656-657 (1954).
"Brewster, supra, note *46 at 65-67.
"1213 U.S. 347 (1909).
"FALK, supra, note 48 at 271, 282-285.
"Raymond, supra note 47 at 560-561.
"FALK, supra note 48 at 272.
"9148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
"FALK, supra note 48 at 276-277.
'Raymond, supra note 47 at 569 (note 23).
"Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws 63 YALE L.J.
639, 641 (1954); FALK, supra note 48 at 279; Raymond, supra note 47 at 560; Brewster, supra note
46 at 72.
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essence of Judge Hand's "impact theory" includes the following language: 63
[I]t is settled law-as "limited" itself agrees-that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has con-
sequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other
states will ordinarily recognize.
The two major cases which Judge Hand cites as precedent for this argument are
Strassheim v. Daily6 and Ford v. United States. 65
In the Ford case, the Supreme Court upheld the seizure of a British vessel and
her crew who were convicted under the Prohibition Act of illegally importing
liquor into the United States. 66 Although the sailors seized outside of American
territorial waters committed acts which had consequences inside the country
(the Alcoa situation 67), they were also party to a criminal conspiracy which was
followed by overt acts61 within the country (not present in Alcoa). In any event,
the Ford decision quoted from and rested primarily upon Strassheim for its
authority. 69
In Strassheim, the Supreme Court upheld a state's right to convict a defen-
dant accused of defrauding the State through an agent even though the
defendant was not present in the State on the days when the criminal acts were
committed7" arguing that: 71
the usage of the civilized world would warrant Michigan in punishing him, although
he never had set foot in the State until after the fraud was complete. Acts done outside
a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it
justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.
What is especially interesting about this opinion is that it was written only two
years after Banana, by Justice Holmes himself, and includes as authority for the
argument quoted-American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 71
The reference in Strassheim is to Banana at page 356 7 3-the page which
includes Justice Holmes' familiar statement of the territoriality principle: "But
the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
3Alcoa, at 443.
"1221 U.S. 280 (1911).







"Indeed, Banana is the only federal case which Holmes cites in behalf of his argument.
7"The citation as it appears in Strassheim at 285 is: "American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 356."
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done.""' The portion of Holmes' argument which precedes this statement (not
surprisingly) is a list of circumstances under which states exercise various forms
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.' 5 And the only one of these examples from
American practice which does not concern piracy7 6 or regions subject to no
sovereign" is a statement of the "protected interest principle":' 8 "In cases
immediately affecting national interests (states) may go further still and may
make, and, if they get the chance, execute similar threats as to acts done within
another recognized jurisdiction.""
The primary reason for tracing the winding and disconnected thread of
authority upon which Alcoa is apparently based back to Justice Holmes and the
Banana decision, Alcoa's presumed antithesis in terms of jurisdictional
theory, 80 is simply to underscore the ultimate futility of trying to explain the
course of American extraterritorial jurisdiction practice in the antitrust area
exclusively in terms of neat and orderly principles of jurisdictional theory, which
are frequently no more than labels conveniently applied to judicial outcomes.
Had Holmes wished to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute between American
banana companies in Latin America during the early period of that market's
exploitation, he could have combined a "nationality principle" (the proposition
that a sovereign has jurisdiction over its nationals everywhere)81 with a theory of
statutory interpretation permitting the presumption that Congress had intended
extraterritorial extension of the Sherman Antitrust Act where failure to do so
would defeat the usefulness of the legislation.8 2
But a second reason for this exercise in unraveling judicial precedents is to
suggest metaphorically that it is the "protected interest principle" which comes
closest to describing (though not justifying) Judge Hand's decision in Alcoa. 3
"Banana at 356.
"Banana at 355-356.
"Banana at 356: "They go further at times and declare that they will punish any one, subject or
not, who shall do certain things, if they can catch him, as in the case of pirates on the high seas."
"Banana at 355-356: "No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law
that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such countries may treat some relations
between their citizens as governed by their own law, and keep to some extent the old notion of
personal sovereignty alive."
"Harvard Research in InternationalLaw, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime 29 AM. J. IN'L L.,
Supp. 543 (1935) I. BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 296-297 (1973); M.
Garcia-Mora, CriminalJurisdiction Over Foreigners for Treason and Offenses Against the Safety of
the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory 19 U. Prrr. L. REV. 567, 575, 578.
"Banana at 356.
"FALx, supra, note 48 at 270-271, 276-277.
"Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-437 (1932).
"
2 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98.
"Haight, supra, note 62 at 639-640, cannot see how the "protected interest principle" could be the
basis for Judge Hand's position because "No such 'protective' principle, however, is recognized by the
United States or Great Britain." Even the pages from Harvard Research cited by Haight in support
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The "objective territorial theory" 4 -far from being a legal imperative-is not
even a plausible label for what the court did in Alcoa, since that notion would
have to be stretched beyond the breaking point. R.Y. Jennings expressed the
point very effectively:85
[The objective territorial principle] is often said to apply where the offense "takes effect"
or "produces its effects" in the territory. In relation to elementary cases of direct
physical injury, such as homicide, this is unexceptionable, for here the "effect" which is
meant is an essential ingredient of the crime.
"Once we move out of the sphere of direct physical consequences, however,"
Jennings continues,
to employ the formula of "effects" is to enter upon a very slippery slope; for here the
effects within the territory may be no more than an element of alleged consequential
damage which may be more or less remote .... If indeed it were permissible to found
objective territorial jurisdiction upon the territoriality of more or less remote reper-
cussions of an act wholly performed in another territory, then there were virtually no
limit to a State's territorial jurisdiction.
Indeed, both advocates 6 and opponents"7 of the "intended impact theory"
have suggested that its interior rationale is in fact the "protected interest prin-
ciple." If the United States has elevated its economic policy interests in the
enforcement of antitrust legislation against foreign corporations abroad to a
point where jurisdiction is asserted over them on the implicit ground that they
are in effect threatening, through their conduct outside the United States,
American national security-then we have gone a considerable distance toward
reviving Cutting Case politics of judicial arrogance."8
Postscript: Laws and Men
It will be apparent that the two sections of this essay on extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction stand in a curious theoretical relationship to each other:
one presents a sector of the legal apparatus (a blue-ribbon legislative commit-
tee) employing legal principle conservatively in order to avoid exercising juris-
of his analysis indicate that he is wrong. See Harv. Res., supra, note 15 at 543-544; and especially
Garcia-Mora, supra, note 78 at 575, 578; also Wiesner, A Half Century of Jurisdictional Develop-
ment: From Bananas to Watches 7 MIAMI L.Q. 400, 403.
4Raymond, supra, note 47 at 368-369.
"Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws BRIT. YEARBOOK
OF INT'L L. 146, 159 (1957).
"Raymond, supra, note 47 at 568 (note 21); Timberg, A.B.A. Section of Int. and Comp. L., 1957
Proceedings 51.
'rBrownlie, supra, note 10 at 294 (note 2): "See U.S. v. Aluminum Company of America... In
American antitrust cases wide extension of the territorial principle might be explained by, though it is
not expressed in terms of, a principle of protection"; George, supra, note 28 at 613 includes the
antitrust controversy under the heading of problems involving the "protected interest principle."
"See Moore, Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case U.S. FOR. REL. 757, (1887);
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (ed. by H. Lauterpacht, VIII ed.) Vol. 1 331-332; Raymond,
supra, note 47 at 568-569.
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diction over nationals where that jurisdiction could be readily asserted without
doing violence to the mainstream of legal precedent; the other presents a
different sector of the legal apparatus (a federal district court) assuming an
avant-garde position in relation to the same body of legal principle in order to
legitimize the exercise of jurisdiction over non-nationals. A short-hand recon-
ciliation of these apparently divergent practices can be achieved on the plane of
identical subordination of legal ideology to social and economic interest: Britain
does not want to prosecute its own citizens for fighting ("illegally") a war which
Britain (tacitly) supported as part of a CIA-backed 9 counterinsurgency force;
the United States is willing to prosecute foreign corporations for ("legally")
interrupting the normal flow of strategic imports (e.g., aluminum).90
But it is submitted that this reconciliation is itself only "apparent" and
constitutes a kind of reductionism of considerable magnitude. The "funda-
mental notions of international law" Lauterpacht refers to in the quotation at
the beginning of the essay should not be given the appearance of standing in
relation to the "more tangible political interests" which he also refers to, in the
same way "superstructure" is so frequently related to "base" or phenomena to
essence in the idealistic Hegelian model.
It is more complicated than that. In his social history of the Black Act,
Edward Thompson concludes:91
Thus the law (we agree) may be seen instrumentally as mediating and reinforcing
existent class relations and, ideologically, as offering to these a legitimation. But we
must press our definitions a little further. For if we say that existent class relations
were mediated by the law, this is not the same thing as saying that the law was no more
than those relations translated into other terms, which masked or mystified the reality.
This may, quite often, be true but it is not the whole truth. For class relations were
expressed, not in any way one likes, but through the forms of law; and the law, like
other institutions which from time to time can be seen as mediating (and masking)
existent class relations (such as the Church or the media of communication), has its
own characteristics, its own independent history and logic of evolution.
So it is never a question of placing specific legislative enactments or recom-
mendations, particular judicial decisions, in their "larger" social context. On
the contrary, the problem is how to describe a fully articulated whole composed
of relatively autonomous structures (law, science, economics, childhood, etc.),
each independently animated by its own structure in dominance, dislocations,
contradictions, and rhythm of development. The economy is determinant but as
Engels said "only in the last instance." And as Althusser correctly observes,
"the last instance never comes." 9 2
"Marcum, Lessons of Angola 54 FOREIGN AFFAmS 407, 414.
'FALx, supra, note 48 at 265-272.
91E. THOMPSON, Winos AND HUNTERS: THE ORinoi oF Tim BLACK ACT 262 (1975).
"See L. ALTHUSSER AND E. BA.iLAR, READING CAPsrrA . (1970).
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